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IN DEFENSE OF A PRINCIPLED JUDICIARY
Is there not a cause?'
Edward E. McAteer*
The Supreme Court has a unique function in the American dem-
ocratic Republic. In a column written near the end of the Court's
1990-91 term, judicial analyst Patrick B. McGuigan observed,
Constitutional law should be orderly, largely predictable. For years,
analyses of Supreme Court rulings were recitations of liberal aca-
demic theories fused into constitutional litigation. Creeping con-
servative success in the federal judiciary is undoing the decades-long
successes of academics and litigators in getting the U.S. Supreme
Court to mandate policies liberals could never attain through legis-
lative majorities.'
For decades, the justices themselves undermined the honor
which ought to be afforded the third branch of the federal govern-
ment as they regularly exceeded the proper, limited but vitally im-
portant role they ought to play. October term after October term,
the justices acted as a permanent constitutional convention, dis-
rupting legislative accommodations and settled precedent with
regularity.
McGuigan, the author and editor of several books on judicial
controversies who now serves as chief editorial writer at The Daily
Oklahoman, noted that
Judicial activists, for decades, seemed to assert that "law" is
whatever a majority of the Supreme Court says it is .... So long as
William Brennan - perhaps, as Pat Buchanan remarked .... the
most powerful man in the last 30 years of American history - domi-
nated the Supreme Court, this was comfortable for the liberals. 3
1. I Samuel 17:29.
* President, The Religious Roundtable; Former National Director, Christian Freedom
Foundation; Former National Director, The Conservative Caucus.
2. Patrick B. McGuigan, The Court, The Judges, The Law, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, June 6,
1991, at 12.
3. Id.
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The particulars of those excesses are too numerous to record in
this offering from a part-time preacher and part-time participant
in the debate on judicial policy. However, a brief recital of some
notable judicial excesses of decades past and present might en-
courage readers to dt least consider the legitimacy of the views ex-
pressed here - views shared by millions of Americans which con-
tributed to conservative electoral majorities in the last three
presidential elections.
In recent decades, procedures mandated by judges resulted in
the acquittal or release of countless thousands of real - not theo-
retical - criminals who had impacted the lives of actual -not fic-
tional - victims. Willie Horton, after all, is a criminal whose story
first rose to national prominence in the campaign of Democrat
United States Senator Al Gore of Tennessee when he sought his
party's presidential nomination in 1988.4 Defenders of the activist
judiciary can decry and distort the part Horton later played in
George Bush's presidential campaign as often as they want. The
fact is Horton symbolized the reality of America's cities and sub-
urbs - where the law-abiding citizens have often seemed to have
fewer rights than the criminals.
To the relief of millions the new functioning majority of "inter-
pretivists" on the United States Supreme Court seems on the verge
of recognizing and reaffirming a common sense understanding of
criminal procedure which the founding generation shared. As
Thomas Jefferson put it, "[I]t frequently happens that wicked and
dissolute men resigning themselves to the domination of inordinate
passions, commit violations on the lives, liberties and property of
others."5 Jefferson believed "that the secure enjoyment of these
having principally induced men to enter into society, government
would be defective in its purpose were it not to restrain such crimi-
nal acts, by inflicting due punishments on those who perpetrate
them."6
4. While popular lore suggests that President Bush was the first to use the "Willie Hor-
ton" television advertisement, Senator Al Gore (D-Tennessee) actually used the advertise-
ment in the fight for the Democratic nomination. See R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr., Horton's Climb
to Celebrity, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, at B1.
5. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Apportioning Crimes & Punishments, in cases heretofore





As the High Court moves to streamline appeals procedures in
capital cases, as it firms up a "good faith" exception to the exclu-
sionary rule fashioned by its predecessors, and as it generally acts
with prudence and common sense in most criminal justice cases
brought before it, millions of Americans are applauding the results.
Perhaps the most befuddled area of modern Supreme Court ju-
risprudence - a labyrinth incomprehensible to even the most
skilled litigators Left and Right - is that surrounding the First
Amendment's religion clauses: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof....
Beginning slowly in the late 1940's and accelerating in the
1960's, the Court gave constitutional authority to a turn of phrase
Thomas Jefferson used in a letter to the Danbury Baptists. The
Court's gradual adoption of Justice Hugo Black's use of Jefferson's"wall of separation between church and state" 8 - a phrase found
nowhere in the nation's founding documents - led to quirky re-
sults in substantive law.
Justices of the past have declared unconstitutional a variety of
historic and utterly reasonable partnerships between government
and religious entities in the provision of education. The justices
have said nativity scenes on public property were alright so long as
Santa Claus was nearby. In Lemon D. Kurtzman,9 the justices
adopted a three-part test which is universally regarded as beyond
interpretation, with the result that even private devotional prac-
tices by individual students and teachers are regarded by some as
unconstitutional.
A more recent and more conservative Court allowed to stand a
laudable public program to promote teen-age chastity, even when
those involved in the program were religious persons.10 So, in the
area of church-state cooperation (as opposed to establishment of a
7. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
8. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1878)); Illinois v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948); Torcaso v. Watkins,
367 U.S. 488, 493 (1961); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962).
9. 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
10. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (upholding that the Adolescent Family Life
Act did not violate the Establishment Clause where the Act expressly included religious
groups as potenital participants in carrying out the Act's mission). In Bowen, the Court
concluded that the Adolescent Family Life Act, on its face, had "a valid secular purpose,
[did] not have the primary effect of advancing religion, and [did] not create an excessive
entanglement of church and state." Id. at 617.
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state-approved religion), the Court seems headed in the right
direction.
However, even the new, improved Supreme Court demonstrates
confusion in the First Amendment arena. One of the best justices
of all is not without sin in this area, so let me cast a stone. In the
controversial peyote case involving Native American religious prac-
tices, Justice Antonin Scalia opined that the use of peyote was not
a protected, individual religious activity. That strikes many as cor-
rect, but Scalia's broad language is widely interpreted as threaten-
ing to practices traditionally afforded vigorous judicial protection.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's critique of Scalia's analysis gives
some hope that a future Court will demonstrate renewed sensitiv-
ity to religious practices which might strike some as odd, but which
nonetheless deserve strong protection in a free society.
In the Court term under way as this essay is written, the justices
- who begin each session with a prayer - are considering whether
non-sectarian prayers at public high school functions amount to a
violation of the First Amendment." I am optimistic believers will
find something to applaud in the Court's eventual ruling on this
case.
Given the use past Supreme Court justices made of one Thomas
Jefferson letter to the Danbury Baptists, there might be reason to
hope that a future Court will turn, if not to constitutional text,
then perhaps to Jefferson's generous letter to the Ursuline Sisters
of New Orleans (written while he was actually President of the
United States), in which he went to great lengths to assure the
sisters he believed his government should afford great protection
to them in their works of charity. As lawyer Mark Chopko has
noted, in this and other actions as President, Jefferson demon-
strated he "did not intend for the government to be an enemy of
religion, but rather to be benevolently supportive of the many
works that religious institutions undertook for the common good.
Timeworn ideas about Jefferson must yield to better evidence." 2
11. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, aff'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. granted,
111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991).
12. Mark Chopko, General Counsel, United States Catholic Conference, Remarks Before
a Red Mass Luncheon in Norwich, Connecticut (Sept. 8, 1991). An Article about Mr.
Chopko's speech appears in Has U.S. Society Become Anti-Religious? 21 ORIGINs (CNS
Documentary Service) 306 (1991).
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There is no naive confidence in this corner that the present
Rehnquist Court will perform perfectly in this area, but there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the Court will act with greater
sensitivity to American traditions than either the Warren or Bur-
ger Courts.
After all, the American Constitution was formed by a generation
which presupposed the existence and dominion of God and his
laws. The Declaration of Independence is full of calls to universal
standards of morality, but Jefferson's allusions to God's eternal
laws were not limited to the Declaration. James Madison, in The
Federalist No. 43, referred to "the transcendent law of nature and
of nature's God. .. ," 1 Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No.
31 referenced "first principles", an explicit reference to the Bible.14
The great Justice Joseph Story, whom many believe was second
only to John Marshall in early constitutional interpretation, held
that Natural Law was "at the foundation of all other laws."' 5
The respect for Judeo-Christian moral traditions which perme-
ated the founding generations is not necessarily dispositive in
every judicial controversy, where intervening precedents and tradi-
tions play important roles. It does yield, however, an understand-
ing of First Amendment jurisprudence somewhat at odds with
Hugo Black's expansive reading of Jefferson's "wall of separation"
phrase.
The quintessential example of judicial excess, of course, was the
controversial Roe v. Wade' 6 decision of 1973. Justice Byron White
- an appointee of a Democrat president - aptly described that
edict as an exercise "in raw judicial power.' 7 It has taken nearly
twenty years for a broad coalition of Americans - those who be-
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).
14. See Hebrews 5:12.
15. JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 65 (1971) (citing
Joseph Story, The Value and Importance of Legal Studies, A Discourse Pronounced at the
Inauguration of the Author as Dane Professor of Law in Harvard University (Aug. 25, 1829)
in THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 533 (William W. Story ed., 1852)).
16. 410 U.S. 113, 222 (1973). Justice White was one of the two dissenters in Roe, and
remains on the Court as of this writing. He has continued to criticize the decision. In one
case, he expressed fears the case invariably results in the Court engaging "in the unre-
strained imposition of its own, extraconstitutional value preferences. . . ." Thornburg v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 794 (1986) (White, J.,
dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist aptly declared that Roe "partakes more of judicial leg-
islation than it does of a determination of the intent of the drafts of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
17. The End of Roe; Supreme Court and Abortion, NAT. REV., Mar. 24, 1989, at 12.
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lieve in the sanctity of innocent, unborn human life, in concert
with legal theorists concerned with the decision's impact on sepa-
ration of powers and federalism - to bring about the political cli-
mate which might, in the next few years, lead to an explicit rever-
sal of Roe.
Conservatives wonder why in the world the argument of the last
two decades was even necessary. Roe had little to do with constitu-
tional law, as even Professor John Hart Ely observed at the time,"8
and made little pretense of being a constitutional decision in the
traditional sense. It was an unprincipled edict driven by the outer
fringe of modern activist jurisprudence, an edict which will soon be
reversed to the nation's benefit.
Unhappily, two decades of a moral public policy may result,
temporarily, in a moral blind spot among many Americans, with
the result that it will require Herculean efforts to restore full pro-
tection to unborn members of the human family. But with the de-
bate returned to state legislatures and to the people, at least some
protections can be enacted in the short-term, with more compre-
hensive protections the focus of long term political action. Con-
servatives do not fear the debate, so long as there can finally be a
debate.
Americans never voted for the drastic policy changes which fed-
eral judges mandated in the Warren and Burger Court eras. A few
of those changes - as in the race-related judicial mandates -
were constitutionally justifiable. In other public policy areas, most
of the sweeping liberal precedents were unjustified. Conservatives
believe that none of the changes in abortion policy were merited
from the standpoint of either constitutional law or good public pol-
icy. Therefore, the re-empowerment of elected representatives
which is now occurring is welcomed among conservatives and Bi-
ble-believing Americans.
To sum up, there is rejoicing in the land that we now have a
Supreme Court which comes much closer to playing the role of
even-handed referee, rather than active participant in public policy
disputes. The determination of Presidents Ronald Reagan and
George Bush to appoint to the judiciary women and men who hold
traditional values, including judicial restraint, is resulting in a
third branch of government usually content to leave tough political
18. See RONALD W. REAGAN, ABORTION AND THE CONSCIENCE OF THE NATION 16 (1984).
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questions in the two branches of government where they belong -
the executive and the legislative.
This is likely to yield an ironic political equation in the next few
years. Look for liberals to denigrate the justices as they exercise a
proper, limited role, and for conservatives to emerge as sometimes
uncomfortable defenders of a principled judiciary.
The clearest sign that the justices are edging steadily back to
restrained jurisprudence is paradoxical coverage of the Court in
the liberal-oriented national media. On the one hand, Americans
are asked to believe that a Court that might allow state legislatures
again to deal with abortion policy is a fundamental threat to our
liberties. On the other hand, the most widely read liberal analysts
bemoan how allegedly boring recent terms of the Court have been,
as the justices deal with a reduced volume of cases and write ma-
jority opinions that focus on narrow questions rather than sweep-
ing categories of national policy.
It is not my contention that the justices are now playing their
role perfectly. As noted above, a majority of the justices afford less
protection to religious beliefs than those beliefs deserve, although
Justice Scalia's sweeping pronouncements might yet be restrained
by his colleagues, or by himself in some future case.
Nonetheless, a healthy process of long overdue reconsideration
of short term (ten to thirty years) liberal precedent is underway,
and it will happily yield precedents more in tune with American
traditions.
Pat McGuigan outlined the broad outlines of this new era in his
article last year: "Conservatives assert judicial construction of law
must seek neutral principles, objectively applied in given cases or
controversies. Now, as time goes on, American will find of increas-
ing significance the subtle differences between William Rehnquist's
majoritarianism, Anthony Kennedy's precedent-consciousness and
Antonin Scalia's brand of libertarianism."19
It's true. Conservatives are dominating the judicial debate at the
Supreme Court for the first time since I was a child. There will
continue to be heart-breaking disappointments, but it seems cer-
tain a search for neutral principles is under way, one which will
yield a judiciary close to the ideal of "original intent" or "original
understanding", as the good Judge Robert Bork has defined it:
19. McGuigan, supra note 2, at 12.
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"The judge's authority derives entirely from the fact that he is ap-
plying law and not his own personal values. . .How should a judge
go about finding the law? The only legitimate way is by attempting
to discern what those who made the law intended."20
I speak for millions of Bible-believing Americans when I say:
Amen, Judge Bork!
20. Id.
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